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Abstract 
 
Purpose –This article deals with the relationship existing between the emotional aspect and 
decision-making processes. More specifically, it examines the links between emotional 
intelligence, decision biases and effectiveness of the governance mechanisms. The primary 
purposes of this article are to: consider emotional intelligence like new research ideas that 
make important contributions to society; offer suggestions for improving manuscripts 
submitted to Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations; and 
discuss methods for enhancing the validity of inferences made from research. 
Design/methodology/approach – The article explain that the main cause of organization’s 
problems is CEO emotional intelligence level.  I will use three models (linear regression and 
logistic binary regression ) to examine this relation: every model treats the relationship 
between emotional intelligence and one of efficiency criteria of the board. Emotional 
intelligence has been measured according to the scale of Schutte and al (Shutte Self Report 
Emotional Intelligence Scale, SSREI, Shuttle and al. 1998) with a high internal validity level. 
Regarding, The four cognitive biases they have been measured by means of a questionnaire 
comprising several items. As for the selected sample, it has been composed of some180 
Bangladeshi  executives (belonging to 60 firms). 
Findings – Our results have revealed that the presence of a high emotional intelligence rate is 
not always positively correlated with the executives’ suggestibility with respect to 
behavioural biases. They have also affirmed the existence of a complementarily relationship 
between emotional intelligence and the directors’ board. Authors need to consider that 
emotional witch permit to minimize CEO emotional biases and provide director’s board 
effectiveness. 
Research limitations/implications – This article has implications for the development of   
CEO emotional intelligence capacity. Besides, some psychological aspects of theoretical 
nature could not be wholly approached in a complete empirical way.  
Practical implications – The article push organization to select managers based on their 
levels of intelligence emotional (apply tests of emotional intelligence in place psychometric 
tests). Also, it increase the validity of inferences made from research in the field. 
Social implications– This article incite governments to establish a training programs witch 
aimed the  
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development of learning of emotional intelligence. Thus, it has important implications for 
enhancing the well being of individuals, organizations, and society as a whole. 
Originality/value – Actually, for the sake improving the explanatory power of legal-financial 
approach of governance, the behavioural dimension has been integrated for a more thorough 
analysis of the directors’ board role. Our goal consists in highlighting the role played by 
emotional intelligence as a skill or tool available for the manager or controller to minimize the 
behavioural biases (bias of loss aversion, optimism, over-confidence and lack of cognitive 
flexibility), and achieves an effective control. 
Keywords: emotional intelligence; cognitive bias; corporate governance; board of directors. 
 
Introduction 
The governance theories have evolved substantially, undressing a shift from create modelling, 
primarily based on the financial model, into more complex and, presumably, more realistic 
and pragmatic models involving the whole set of stakeholders, playing a great deal of 
importance on the productive capacity aspect as much as on the allocation aspect Jensen and 
Meckling (1976),  Shleifer and Vishny (1997),  Zingales (1998), Rajan and  Zingales (1998) 
Blair and Stout  (1999), Laporta and al (2000), …etc. 
 
This development, guided and inspired by the evolution in firm related theories have made of 
the human capital and the human resources management the focal point of the governance 
concerns. Indeed, the value creation process has been the major subject matter of the 
corporate governance theories. Each approach (whether cognitive or disciplinary) has initiated 
a process phase in order to reduce the conflicts of interests, problems of wealth/profit 
distribution and cognitive conflicts. Despite these approaches contribution in matters of 
governance, diverse aspects of the governance system have still remained misunderstood or 
not even perceived, hence the need to integrate the behavioural dimension within the 
governance approaches. In this respect, sheffrin (2001) has stated that the introduction of a 
behavioural dimension leads to an approximation of finance and governance convergence 
with the other management sciences, which may help mutual complementary overlapping and 
intermingling. 
 
Noteworthy, our idea has been inspired by the behavioural approach and aims at highlighting 
the emotional intelligence role in minimizing the behavioural biases and improving 
governance mechanisms efficiency including the directors’ board. Certain literary works and 
elements pertaining to emotional intelligence and work performance likely provide and 
supply us with relevant clues and hints to support and sustain our intuition and line of work 
serve as a basis background for our research. 
 1. Literature Review and Hypothesis  
The analysis elaborated by Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Zahra and Pearce (1989), 
Yermack (1996), Eisenberg and al (1998) Cui and Mak (2002), Carapeto and al (2005), 
Adams and al (2009) … etc has shows that the Board of Directors is characterized by several 
closely-related attributes. Among these attributes, one can distinguish board’s composition 
with respect its size, to the subdivision into internal and external managers and to the 
representation of the concerned relevant parties or "stakeholders" among are, namely, the 
employees, the creditors, the institutional bodies, the customers, the suppliers…etc. 
 
In addition to presenting the governance mechanism attributes, the contractual theories have 
dealt with initiated the notion of this board’s efficiency: the agency theory has demonstrated 
that tackled the council effectiveness is conditional upon the controller’s skill and motivation. 
The theory of the leaders’ implantation represents a third condition namely the independence 
with regards to the leader Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Denis and McConnell (2003), Gillan 
(2006), Bulan and al (2009),……etc. Hence, in this section, the central objective consists in 
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highlighting the type of relationship existing between emotional intelligence and the Board of 
director’s efficiency. 
 
1.1.  Loss aversion, emotional intelligence and director’s board efficiency 
The available literature enables to affirm that emotional intelligence plays a crucial role in the 
subordinates’ perception of the leader’s efficiency (George, 2000). More exactly, most of 
concerned studies have shown that a well emotionally intelligent leader having a higher 
emotional intelligence is an effective one. 
 
This achieved result, pertaining to the field of management, affirms the observation of 
Greenfield (2002) regarding the difficulty met by the internal administrators. Blair and al 
(2000), postulate that these administrators cannot behave against the interests of their leader 
or their superiors. The inability to oppose the leader’s taken decisions can be explained by the 
awareness of his "internal" controllers regarding these decisions’ efficiency. Although 
emotional intelligence has reduced the aversion loss in the controller’s perception and mind as 
well in the manager’s suggestable decisions regarding this type of bias, it appears to be a 
hindrance to the director’s board effectiveness as a controlling organ. In their proposed 
model, Mayer and Salovey (1997) have estimated that emotional intelligence plays an 
important role not only in regulating and controlling emotions but also in developing 
intellectual and cognitive processes (Lopes and al , 2005; Song and al, 2010). The absence of 
this skill implies an uncertainty, which, according to Anderson (1983) , may lead to aversion 
complaining the individual, “the controller”, to apply a conservative trend and refuse any 
decision (Trautmann and al, 2009; Vieider, 2009) likely to alter his current status ( improving 
of his role as he is forced to oppose any decision taken by the managing team). However, an 
emotionally wise intelligent controller, eager to reduce his losses has to take mediating stand 
to arbitrate between the acquired advantages by his participation in director’s boards and the 
efficiency of his control. Hence, he is likely lose a lot by opposing the leaders’ decisions 
(Petrides and al, 2007; Siu, 2009) 
It can be notice, that emotional intelligence, as being the controller’s exclusive individual 
capacity, would enable him to minimize the sensation of aversion risk and ensure the control 
efficiency. By contrast, according to the implanting theory this vision is erroneous. Indeed, 
agents can enjoy particular skills (such as emotional intelligence) to acquire and interpret 
information about the company, its environment and its actors (essentially the leader). 
However, a great deal of information can never be handled and remains at the leader’s 
exclusive disposal. In this case, emotional intelligence would reduce the controller’s 
uncertainty as regards the quality of information being at his disposal. It can be considered as 
a skill competence which may facilitate the leader’s implantion and reassesses the efficiency 
of control exerted by the administrators. In this respect the following hypothesis seem worth 
proposing: 
 
H1: the more the aversion loss decreases (high level of emotional intelligence), the more the 
board’s control would be effective. 
 
1.2.  Optimism, emotional intelligence and the director’s board efficiency  
The probability that optimism may prevail and wine over of the administrators has challenged 
the director’s board disciplinary power and put it into question (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
Thus, optimism the firm partners’ optimism implies an unlimited discretionally space for the 
leader and, causes disparities in the distribution of created value there of. 
 
Gervais and al (2003) have even show that the leaders’ delivered stock-options, aimed 
reducing the agency problems, would encourage them to take even greater risks which 
contradicts the shareholders’ interests. As an illustration, on facing an acquisition plan, and 
owing to his there optimism, the leader can overestimate the synergies along with the target 
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(Goel and Thakor, 2008; Campbell and al, 2011).  This error of valuation will not necessarily 
be corrected by the board of directors or by the investors who are themselves victims of a bias 
of optimism (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
 
Bhagat and Black (2000) have stressed the role of the wage-earning managers in minimizing 
the optimism bias and there of improving, of the functioning of the governance mechanisms, 
namely including the board of directors. Another possible resolution likely to minimize 
optimism bias in the development of emotional competences including emotional intelligence. 
The latter in fact, transmits an individual capacity to manage his proper emotions as well as 
the others’ (Côté and al, 2006; Côté and al, 2010), and particularly to apply them in a way that 
reinforces the effectiveness of cognitive processes, (Goleman, 2001). In other words, 
emotional intelligence allows every individual, (whether leader, manager or controller) to be 
aware of his firm’s strengths, and weaknesses as well as the competence of the leading team 
competences which is likely to reduce the degree of his optimism. Zeidner and al (2004) have 
shown the positive role that emotional intelligence could play in reducing the amount of 
optimism bias among executives. Therefore, one might well notice that according to these 
studies, there exists a positive Impact of emotional intelligence on improving the directors’ 
board functioning. Hence, the following hypothesis appears worth stating: 
 
H2: the more optimism diminishes, the more the control exerted by the director’s board is 
efficient.                                                                            
 
1.3. Overconfidence, emotional intelligence and the director’s board efficiency. 
Ben-David and al (2006) have postulated that an extreme appeal to confidence mechanisms is 
likely to result in the loss of effectiveness. In fact, being over-confident of his capacities and 
personal competences, the leader will be encouraged to undertake a rooting policy and 
manipulate information in such a way as to preserve his investment in a certain specific 
capital (Lo and al, 2007). This information manipulation hinders the functioning of the 
governance mechanisms including that of the board of directors. 
 
By means of illustration, confidence excess would certainly encourage the leader to 
overestimate his proper projects, (Baker and al 2004). Moreover, and according to (Duhaime 
and Schwenk, 1983), the leader tends to believe that he has a control over the investment 
plans or over other elements on which he has no impact. Still, some analyses consider that 
this bias can have some advantageous effects. Le Blanc and Rachlinski (2005) have noticed 
that, by increasing the number of transactions, the over-confidence bias among investors may 
lead to a better revelation of information along with higher market liquidity. In tow, Elster 
(1998) has postulated that emotions can correct the indeterminations resulting by indecisions 
of the calculation reasoning. In other words, emotions, particularly emotional intelligence, 
tend to guide the individual towards rationality relevant (Mayer and al, 2008). Data 
dominantly suggested that individuals with endowed with a high level of emotional 
intelligence would be more aware of the influencing factors affecting their positive and 
negative emotions (Rode and al, 2007; Karim, 2010). Actually awareness and understanding 
of these emotion-triggering factors would allow the managers to select the moor appropriate 
actions and improve the directors’ board effectiveness as a governance mechanism. As for 
Damasio (1994), emotional intelligence improves the decisions quality as well as the ability 
adaptation by allowing the harmonization of the different cognitive processes. It is even 
regarded by some writers as an essentially crucial motor of organizational performance 
(Goleman and al, 2001) 
 
As a matter of fact, emotional intelligence allows every individual to develop an emotional 
consciousness whirly to react to different situations. It would help the manager to better 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766(Paper) ISSN 2225-0484(Online) 
Vol.2, No.3, 2012 
 
67 
recognize himself (by reducing over-confidence) and maintain safeguard his motivation to 
achieve his projects. It is, therefore, important to evaluate the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: the more the confidence excess decreases, the more the directors’ board control is 
effective. 
 
1.4. Cognitive flexibility, emotional intelligence and the directors’ board efficiency  
Recently elaborated reflections and thoughts pretending to the administrators’ role as set up 
by Jensen and Fuller (2003) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) have recommended a  drastic 
reform of the managers’ role in such a way that they can guarantee on the one hand the 
fairness honesty and integrity of all the organization members, and, on other hand, honesty 
play an intermediary role between the leaders and the financial markets so that the latter 
would better understand the possible outcomes impacts and consequences of the strategic 
choices and alternatives or  the company’s value. The managers would, then, under the 
responsibility of guiding the leaders’ decisions. This new role actually requires a cognitive 
flexibility and an ability of adaptation to changes. This adaptation capacity necessitates a high 
level of emotional intelligence. Indeed, Huy (2002) has shown that only a double condition 
can radical changes be implemented,  namely: 1-The projects of change arouse an emotional 
support among a certain number of managers.2-The managers are aware of listening to, of 
their subordinates’ emotional feeling and response. Hence, an emotionally intelligent 
administrator is capable of having a wide and opened field of vision, a synthetic view large 
enough to globally understand a certain situation (Mayer and al, 2008). This would, in effect, 
improve the evaluation of the leaders’ performance and ensure control efficiency. 
 
In this respect, Sentis (2001) has demonstrated that managers having a discretionary margin 
would seek tools (including the re-evaluation of assets) enabling them to give a good image 
for their firms, thus increasing their pay and ensuring the stability their jobs stability. 
Consequently the leader's cognitive flexibility is negatively correlated with the directors’ 
board efficiency target. For these reasons, the aim of appointing outside directors lies in 
providing the board with certain skills (cognitive flexibility due to a high emotional 
intelligence), and an objective judgement to build a supervisory element and to make sure that 
the leaders’ performance meets the usual standards (Pathan and Skully, 2010). This role can 
not by any means be assumed by executive directors too involved in management. Actually, 
the outside directors moor often bring a fresh and an impartial point of view since they would 
thoroughly examine the problems and from an external perspective. In addition, they provide 
specific answers to certain questions and then may be sources of contact. Indeed several 
studies have pointed out that it is economically advantageous to hire people in respect their 
emotional intelligence (Gendron, 2005). The positive impact of emotional intelligence on 
improving cognitive flexibility and the adaptation ability to shifts of administrators have led 
us to propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: the higher cognitive flexibility is high (high level of emotional intelligence), the more 
effective is the executive’s control by the board of directors. 
2. Methodology   
This section is divided into two subsections, the first of which is denoted to discuss the data 
source, and sample formation, while section 2 discusses our variable measurement.   
 
2.1. Data sample selection 
To note, the empirical tests are based on 60 non-financial Bangladeshi firms during the 2007 
fiscal year (28 are listed companies and 32 are non-listed companies, see table 1). All 
financial firms (including banks) outing to the fact that this business sector is regulated and 
likely to have fundamentally different cash flows and characteristics. Firms with insufficient 
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data regarding about emotional intelligence and the board of director’s composition are also 
excluded. The board’s compositions as well as financial characteristics data are gathered from 
the BVMT annual report.  
 
Table 1 
Visited Companies 
Initial BVMT sample for 2007 50 
financial firms (22) 
Other non financial  firms 80 
Insufficient data to emotionnel intelligence (40) 
Insufficient data to board of directors compositions (8) 
Final sample 60 
 
Emotional intelligence and psychological characteristics are collected by means of an 
administered questionnaire.  Actually, the selected choice deals with some homogeneous 
individuals representing some Bangladeshi  CEO Representatives of 60 firms (100 males, 75 
females, 5 unreported), ranging in age from 25 to 58 (table 2).  Most questionnaires have 
been distributed by the method of door to door to ensure they are personally delivered to the 
concerned person; few among them have been mailed, for businesses located outside the 
Greater Bangladeshi area.  
 
It is worth noting, however, a broader sample that even if it had been envisaged to be studied 
and that more than one hundred eighty questionnaires had been distributed for this purpose, 
we have would received far fewer responses than expected ( return rate  = 50.42%: although 
the number of distributed questionnaires reached 357, the responses received did not 
exceeded 180 CEO). Indeed, a Many of the adduced have refused to respond to our question 
on the ground of several reasons, namely, that: 
• They are too busy and have no time to devote to research; 
• They generally do not pay interest to the questionnaires submitted by students and 
would return them to their assistants or other staff for a response (this has been the 
case of our officer-centred research); 
• They perceive that the questionnaire is a sort of "control" damage to their private 
lives that it is out of question to answer. 
 
Other encountered difficulties are mainly due to the administrative procedures and 
hierarchical procedures which linger questionnaires to the recoveries. Fortunately, the leaders 
who had been kind as to cooperate and help us formulate and set up our sample eventually 
composed of 180 private company leaders belonging mostly to the industrial sector. 
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Table 2 
CEOs’ Characteristics  
  N Percentages 
Age 25-30 years 
31-40 years 
40-49 years 
Over 50 years 
41 
75 
39 
25 
22.77 
41.66 
21.66 
13.88 
 
 
 Gender/
 Sex 
Males 
females 
unreported 
100 
75 
5 
55.55 
41.66 
2.77 
 
 
 
Degree Baccalaureate 
Bac+2 
Bac+4 
DAS/HDSS 
20 
35 
80 
45 
11.11 
19.44 
44.44 
25.00 
 
2.2. Variables’ measurement   
The objective of this section is to determine the variables’ measurement (endogenous and 
exogenous).  
 
2.2.1. Measuring the Board of directors’ characteristics and efficiency 
To note, theories regarding the board of directors, along with prior empirical researches and 
various recommendations have suggested that some board characteristics have an influence 
on the quality of the financial report and on firms’ performance. Three major board 
characteristics are examined here: size, independence and presence of CEO duality (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
 
2.2.1.1. Board size 
Noteworthy, the board’s effectiveness highly depends one the number of directors on its size. 
Relevant literature provides no consensus about the direct relationship between the board size 
and effectiveness. On the one hand, a larger board is less likely to operate effectively and is 
easier for the CEO to control (Jensen, 1993 and Ben Khediri, 2006). On the other hand, 
Yermak (1996) considers that the board’s size is a factor among a range of variables that 
might influence executive compensation and company performance. 
 
In this study the directors board size (BSIZE) has simply been measured by the number of its 
members (Dechow and al, 1996; Yermak, 1996; Peasnell and al, 1998; Coulton and al, 2001 
and Chtourou, 2001).  
 
2.2.1.2. The board’s independence 
The different characteristics pertaining to the boards independence are measured by the 
following variable : BIND is defined as the percentage of the board members who are 
simultaneously independent and non-executives which is  equal to the number of outside 
directors divided by the total board members   (Chtourou and al, 2001; Wright, 1996; Forker, 
1992 ; Haniffa and Cooke, 2000 ).BIND = number of outside directors /total board members. 
 
2.2.1.3. CEO Duality  
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Board chairs role consists in monitoring the CEO (Jensen, 1993). The latter supposes that 
CEOs who also hold the position of board chair (Duality) exert an undue influence on the 
board, compromising the strength of the board’s governance. 
The board chairs characteristics are defined by DUAL = 1 if the CEO is also board chair and 
0 otherwise. 
Table 3 presents the Characteristics of Boards of Directors of the 60 Bangladeshi companies 
included in our study. Bangladeshi companies are run by independent boards, medium 
(7directors) and not be dominated by CEOs. 
Table 3 
Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
variable Mean std Min Max N 
Entire board  7.60 2.56 4 12 60 
Outside directors  2.62 1.11 1 4 60 
Affiliated directors 1.98 0.80 1 3 60 
Inside directors 3.360 1.34 1 5 60 
CEO Duality 0.26 0.44 0 1 60 
2.2.2. The emotional intelligence measure: SSREI TEST 
In this search, we have generated a pool of 18 items Table4 (derived from schutte and al, 
1998 i.e. the SSREI test) based on the theoretical model of emotional intelligence as 
developed by Salovey and Mayer (1990). Each item selected for the initial 18 items pool 
should reflected an adaptive tendency toward emotional intelligence within the models 
framework. Respondents have used a 5-point scale, on which the figure “1” represents 
“strongly disagree” and “5” represents “strongly agree,” to indicate to what extent each item 
described fits them. All parts of the model have been represented by numerous items. Each of 
the first four authors has independently evaluated each item for fidelity to the relevant 
construct, clarity and readability. Noteworthy, some items have been deleted while some 
others have been   added or revised before pilot testing them by asking several individuals to 
complete the scale and note any unclear elements. This process has eventually resulted in a 
pilot-tested pool of 18 items. 
 
Table 4 
Applied Items in the modified 18-item emotional intelligence scale 
Items FACTOR1: 
assessing 
others 
emotions: 
39.976% 
 OF TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
 
FACTOR2: 
evaluating her 
personal 
emotions: 
6.265% 
OF  TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
FACTOR3:  
emotions use in 
Problems 
solving:  
5,610%  
OF  TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
1. I am aware and able to interpret 
or decipher of the non-verbal 
messages other people send. 
0.702   
2. I can tell people as feeling 
through t the tone of their voice. 
0.682   
3. I can understand others feeling 
by just looking at them. 
0.672   
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4. Most of the major remarkable 
events of my life have led me to re-
evaluate what is important and 
what is not. 
0.646   
5. I know when the right moment 
is to speak about my personal 
problems to others. 
0.622   
6. Won facing obstacles, I 
remember times when I faced 
similar obstacles and overcame 
them. 
0.584 0.512  
7. I am aware of my emotions as I 
experience them. 
 0.721  
8. When I feel a change in 
emotions, I tend to come up with 
new ideas. 
 0.700  
9. When I am in a good mood, 
solving problems is easy for me. 
 0.647  
10. I use good moods and may 
sense of humor to help face an 
obstacles. 
 0.627  
11. I can easily recognize my 
emotions as I experience them. 
 0.516  
12. I motivate myself by expecting 
potentially positive. 
  0.656 
13. I seek out activities that would 
thing to hopper on my life make 
me happy. 
  0.599 
14. I expect that I will do well on 
most things I attempts or set for. 
  0.573 
15. Emotions are listing among 
other things that make my life 
worth living. 
  0.573 
16. When my mood changes I for 
see or expect some new 
possibilities. 
  0.528 
17. When I experience a positive 
emotion, I would know how to 
make it last. 
  0.499 
18. I make appreciable 
arrangement of the events which 
others enjoy . 
  0.447 
 
2.2.3. Emotional biases measure 
The second part of our questionnaire (14 items, table 5) focuses on evaluating and scoring of 
the four emotional biases (optimism, overconfidence, risk aversion and cognitive flexibility). 
The questions have been inspired from the questionnaires formulated by the Fern Hill and 
Industrial Alliance companies. 
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Table 5 
Items used in the emotional biases scale (14 items) 
 
Items  FACTOR 1 : 
loss aversion 
50.710% 
OF TOTAL 
VARIANCE 
FACTOR 2: 
optimism 
29.450% 
OF TOTAL 
VARINACE 
FACTOR 3 : 
overconfidence 
10.275% 
OF TOTAL 
VARINACE 
FACTOR 4 :  
cognitive 
flexibility 
5.385% 
OF TOTAL 
VARINACE 
1. What is your 
propensity to take 
financial risks with 
respect to others? 
0.802    
2. With a great 
financial decision, 
what do you care 
about  
more: possible losses 
or possible gains? 
0.742    
3. Insurance can 
protect us against a 
wide variety of risks:  
theft, fire, accidents, 
illness and death ... 
How many  
insurance 
subscriptions have you 
subscribed ho? 
0.713    
4. When you think of 
the word "risk" in a 
financial context, what 
term in the following 
list first comes to 
mind? 
0.686    
5. When I'm faced 
with a challenge, I 
give up because I'm 
afraid of failue. 
0.600    
6. What emotional 
effect do important 
decisions have on you 
once they are taken? 
 0.857   
7. I am motivated by 
imagining the 
successful decisions 
positive results of 
entrepreneurial tasks. 
 
 
0.851   
8. Do you consider 
that degree of 
uncertainty is  the 
business environment 
is 
 0.842   
9. I know how to most   0.774  
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766(Paper) ISSN 2225-0484(Online) 
Vol.2, No.3, 2012 
 
73 
control my emotions. 
10. For how long do 
you reckon to keep 
your position in 
your firm? 
  0.715  
11. How confident are 
you in your ability to 
take 
good financial 
decisions? 
  0.641  
12. How easily do you 
adapt yourself to 
deterioration of your 
financial situation? 
   0.862 
13. your reaction 
regarding  changes in 
your firm environment 
is: 
   0.862 
14. in a job search 
would you rather seek: 
   0.789 
 
2.2.4. Control variables   
Several researches have suggested a significant association between the board of director’s 
efficiency, leverage ratios (LEV) and firm size (LNSIZE) (Ball and Foster, 1982; Dechow 
and al, 1996 and Klein, 2002).  Hence, both leverage ratios and firm size have been included 
as control variables in the present study.  
 
2.2.4.1. Leverage ratios or financial distress costs 
Financial distress can be defined as «the situation in which firms anticipated cash flow of can 
not cover its debts» (Leland, 1998). 
 
However, financial distress could engender costs that may have negative impact on the 
company value, such as the cost of failure (loss of brand image and competitiveness for the 
company).  
Actually, it is due to this reasons the agency theory considers debt as a means to discipline the 
officer and, subsequently, facilitates the task of governance mechanisms. So, the higher the 
debt ratio is, the higher the cost of financial distress is and the more the partners are involved 
in controlling their leaders. In fact, the leverage ratio is going to be essentially retained as a 
measure of this variable. Leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio of total debts to total debts 
plus total assets.    
2.2.4.2. Firms size 
As noted by Ball and Foster (1982), the size has been applied to represent a large number of 
amounts and quantities such as the firm’s competitive advantage and the management team 
capacity (Becker and al, 1998). So the size can be conceded as an indicator of the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms. Hence, the size has been introduced as control 
variable in this research. 
Indeed, most studies have applied total assets or turnover as a measure for firm size (Bujadi 
and Richardson, 1997). In this paper, it is measured through the log of the firm’s total assets 
(LNSIZE). 
For simplification purposes, the summary of each variable extent range in the model, its name 
as well as its expected impact on the effectiveness of the board are depicted in the following 
table: 
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Table 6 
Variables descriptions 
Class : Phenomena : Measure : Variables : Predictions : 
Endogens variables  :  
Board of 
directors  
Board implication in 
the decision   
Number of its 
members 
BSIZE 
The presence of 
independent 
members in the 
board  
 
Number of outside 
directors /total board 
members. 
 
BIND 
 
CEO is also the  
board’s  chair 
1 if the CEO is also 
the board’s chair and 
0 otherwise. 
DUAL 
Exogenous variables : 
Emotional 
intelligence   
Perception and 
administration 
emotions 
Score obtained by 33 
items from Schutte 
and  al     1998 
IE + 
Lost aversion 
 
Loss rumination and 
reputation  
The questionnaire 
obtained score   
LAV - 
Optimism  
Directors 
overestimate 
capacity of their  
firms  
The questionnaire 
obtained score   
OP - 
overconfidence 
Directors 
overestimate their  
personal 
competences  
The questionnaire 
obtained score   
OVER - 
Cognitive 
flexibility  
Reaction to a new 
information 
 
The questionnaire 
obtained score   
CF + 
Controls variables  
Leverage ratios CEO controlled  
Leverage ratios 
= total debts /(total 
debts +total assets) 
LEV + 
Firms size 
Firms signaled 
performance  
Ln (total assets) LNSIZE + 
 
2.3. Empirical model 
 
Y = α + α
1 
IE + α
2 
LAV + α
3 
OP + α
4 
OVER + α
5 
CF + α
6
 LEV + α
7 
LNSIZE + ξ 
Where: 
Y: the board of directors’ efficiency. 
IE: measure index of emotional intelligence. 
LAV: the score of loss aversion. 
OP: the score of optimism. 
OVER:  the score of overconfidence. 
CF:  the score of cognitive flexibility.  
LEV: Leverage ratio.  
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LNSIZE: firm’s size. 
Ξ : the error. 
  
Table 7 presents variables descriptive statistics of our model. Bangladeshi companies are 
characterized by an average debt level, a medium size, and presence of behavioral biases, an 
acceptable level of emotional intelligence and an independent director’s board. 
 
Table 7 
Summary Statistics 
variable Mean std Min Max N 
board size (BSIZE) 7.60 2.56 4 12 60 
Board independence (BIND)  0.40 0.20 0.1 0.8 60 
CEO duality (DUAL) 0.26 0.44 0 1 60 
Emotional intelligence (IE) 50.50 19.86 18 90 60 
Loss aversion (LAV) 10.56 4.73 4 20 60 
Optimism (OP) 11.64 4.27 4 20 60 
Overconfidence (OVER) 9.49 3.806 3 15 60 
Cognitive flexibility (CF) 8.91 3.92 3 15 60 
Leverage ratios (LEV) 0.50 0.27 0,1 1 60 
Firms size (LNSIZE) 9.04 3.35 2.85 15.4 60 
3. Empirical results 
This paper examines the relationship between the board characteristics and emotional 
intelligence. I will use three models to examine this relation: every model treats the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and one of efficiency criteria of the board. Later, 
I will describe different tests which are realized.   
 
3.1. Board efficiency and size 
 
3.1.1. The model would be as follows 
BSIZE= α + α1 IE + α2 LAV + α3 OP + α4 OVER + α5 CF + α6 LEV + α7 LNSIZE+ ξ 
BSIZE: the board size explains and indicates the board’s implication in the decision making. 
 
3.1.2 Empirical tests 
To estimate the model’s parameters, the linear regression method has been applied: the 
objective behind this model is to describe the relationship between the board’s implication in 
decision making and emotional variables (IE and Emotional bias).   
 
3.1.3. Results 
The results depicted in table 8, show that corporate psychological characteristics explain a 
46.6 % of the board’s implication in decision making (R
2 
=46, 6%). These results are actually 
sustain our four advanced hypotheses. Regarding the control variables, the firm size and 
leverage ratio appear to have a significant and negative relationship with the board’s size. 
 
Table 8 also, indicates a significant and negative relationship between emotional intelligence 
and the board’s size (β= -0,485; p=0,000). This result is due to the fact that every director 
enjoying high level of emotional intelligence tends to overlook and neglect other directors 
with different ideologies.  
Besides, the model demonstrates a non-significant and negative relationship between loss 
aversion and the board’s size (β= -0,070; p=0,564).  This result can be explained by the firms’ 
high level of emotional intelligence (the high level of emotional intelligence minimize the 
presence of cognitive bias in the firms’ decisions). 
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As for the regression, it suggests a non-significant and positive relation between optimism 
and the board’s size (β=0,034; p=0,380). This positive relationship is due to the directors’ 
optimism, as they tend to overestimate the CEO’s qualifications and would accept all the 
decisions they make for instance in case of adding new directors.   
 
Moreover, the result has shown a significant and negative relationship between 
overconfidence and the board’s size (β= -0,228; p=0,038). In fact, the following explanations 
could be part forward: first, overconfidence appears to be negative attitude influencing the 
individual’s evaluative capacity. Indeed, overconfident directors tend to overestimate her 
personal capacity and, consequently, would refuse to add new directors to the board. 
 
Regression also presents, an insignificant and positive relationship between cognitive 
flexibility and the board’s size (β=0,191; p=0,533). This may be explained by the fact that a 
director who enjoys a great deal of cognitive flexibility would alway prefer modification and 
seek to enhance a challenging decision. He could tend to be either indifferent or agree to add 
new directors.  
 
Table 8 
Board size results 
Variables  Bêta Significance expected 
relationship 
Reached 
relationship 
Constant 20,865 0 ,000   
IE -0,485 0,000*** - - 
LAV -0,070 0,564 + - 
OP 0,034 0,380 + + 
OVER -0,228 0,038** + - 
CF 0,191 0,533 - + 
LEV -0,326 0,004*** - - 
LNSIZE -0,226 0,042** - - 
Cox and Snell  ratios R
2
 0,466 
**, ***, signifiance at 5% and  1%. 
3.2. Board efficiency and independence members  
3.2.1. The model  
BIND= α + α1 IE + α2 LAV + α3 OP + α4 OVER + α5 CF + α6 LEV + α7 LNSIZE + ξ 
BIND: presence of independent members in the board of directors. 
3.2.2. Empirical tests 
 
To estimate the model’s parameters, the linear regression method has been applied: this 
model’s objective is to describe the nature of relationship between the board’s independence 
and emotional variables (IE and Emotional bias).   
 
3.2.3. Results 
The results appearing on table 9, show that corporate psychological characteristics explain a 
60.8 % proportion of the board’s independence (R
2 
= 60.8%). These results are, actually, 
consolidate four proposed hypotheses. In terms of the control variables, it has been discovered 
that the firm’s size and leverage ratio have a significant and positive relationship with the 
board’s independence. 
 
Results have show a significant and positive relationship between the board’s independence 
and emotional intelligence (β= 0,364; p=0,000). This result can be explained by the argument 
that the firms’ partners who have had a high level of emotional intelligence are conscious 
about risk collusion between the CEO and directors. Owing to this fact, they are found under 
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the obligation to choose independent directors to represent them in the board. This 
interrelatedness shows the positive role emotional intelligence plays in the board’s efficiency.   
Concerning regression, it presents an insignificant and negative relationship between loss 
aversion and the board’s independence (β= -0,009; p=0,943). This type of association could 
be justified by the loss aversion among the firms’ partners as it is the case, for instance, when 
partners refuse to add a new outsider director as this might generate the desperation of 
managerial rent linked to modification in the board composition.    
 
Moreover, the model presents an insignificant and positive relationship between optimism 
and the board’s independence (β= 0,037; p=0,719). This result might be explained by the 
investors’ optimism: investors so optimistic about the firm’s performance are encouraged to 
invest in this firm; hence the number of outsider- directors in the board is likely to increase.  
Table 9 shows a non significant and positive relationship between overconfidence and the 
board’s independence (β= 0,037; p=0,719).  This could be explained by the CEO’s 
overconfidence: this bias would generate some unconsciousness regarding the likely 
outcomes of introducing a new outsider- director in the discretionary space.  
 
As regards cognitive flexibility, it presents a significant and positive relationship with the 
board’s independence (β= 0,175; p=0,126). Actually this can be explained by the board’s 
cognitive role. This role might allow them to instance a new outsider- director highly 
qualified in emotional intelligence. 
 
Table 9 
The board’s independence results 
variables Bêta Significance expected 
relationship 
Reached 
relationship 
Constant -0,348 0 ,005   
IE 0,364 0,000*** + + 
LAV -0,009 0,943 - - 
OP 0,037 0,719 - + 
OVER -0,014 0,881 - + 
CF 0,175 0,126 + + 
LEV 0,442 0,000*** + + 
LNSIZE 0,311 0,001*** + + 
Cox and Snell  ratios R
2
 0,608 
***, significance at 1%. 
3.3. Board efficiency and CEO dual functions 
3.3.1. Model presentation 
DUAL= α + α1 IE + α2 LAV+ α3 OP + α4 OVER + α5 CF + α6 LEV + α7 LNSIZE + ξ 
DUAL: the CEO is also the board’s chair, it takes 1if the CEO is also the board’s chair and 0 
otherwise. 
3.3.2. Empirical tests 
To estimate the model’s parameters, the logistic binary regression method has been applied: 
the objective behind using this model lies in describing the relationship between the CEO’s 
duality and emotional variables (emotional intelligence and Emotional bias).   
 
3.3.3. Results 
The results appearing in have table 10 shown that corporate psychological characteristics 
depict some a 30.4 % of the CEO’s duality (R
2 
= 30.4%). Actually these results are supportive 
of our four advanced hypotheses. Regarding the control variables, one could discover that the 
firm’s size has a significant and positive relationship with the CEO’s duality. 
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The results also highlight a significant and negative relationship between emotional 
intelligence and the CEO’s duality (β= -0,121; p=0,018). This can be justified by the firm 
partners’ high level of emotional intelligence: this competence allows them a better 
evaluation of the CEO’s competence along with the firm performance. In this way, the CEO 
duality is minimized. 
Moreover, regression shows a non significant and negative relationship between loss aversion 
and CEO duality (β= -0,084; p=0,509). This has an explanation in the fact that when the 
shareholders are exposed to risk aversion, they tend to refuse all the CEO’s decisions that 
favour his discretion mainly his dual functions. 
 
As regards optimism, it presents a significant and positive relationship with the CEO’s duality 
(β= 0,508; p=0, 015). The optimistic shareholders appear to accept all the CEO’s decisions 
affecting the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
Added to this, table 8 shows a significant and negative relationship between overconfidence 
and CEO duality of function (β=- 0,338; p=0, 062).  This result is justified by the fact that an 
overconfident CEO has a tendency to overestimate his capacity and personal competence. 
These biases inhibit him from being a board’s chair.    
 
Eventually, this model alludes to a non-significant and positive relationship between 
cognitive flexibility and the CEO duality (β= 0,172; p=0, 404). This result due to the fact that 
the CEO’s high level of cognitive flexibility can improve and broaden his discretionary space 
due to his standing as a board’s chair. 
 
Table 10 
CEO duality results 
Variables Bêta Significance expected 
relationship 
Reached 
relationship 
Constant 2,318 0 ,562   
IE -0,121    0,018*** - - 
LAV -0,084         0,509 + - 
OP 0,508 0,015*** + + 
OVER -0,338 0,062* + - 
CF 0,172 0,404 - + 
LEV -0,013 0,994 - - 
LNSIZE 0,290 0,053** - + 
Cox and Snell  ratios R
2
 0,304 
Model Χ
2
 21,779    p-value=0.003*** 
N 60 
*, **, *** respectively significance at 10%, 5% et 1 
4. DISCUSSION  
It is worth noting that most of the previous analyses have predominantly suggested that the 
leaders’ emotional characteristics have had a significantly noticeable impact on the directors’ 
board efficiency. One might well, ask, however: are these emotional characteristics (whether 
emotional intelligence or emotional bias) the maser are primary determinants of the directors’ 
board efficiency? 
 
Actually, the multiple regressions depicted this study have examines the relationship 
governing and binding the leaders’ emotional characteristics and the board of directors’ 
composition and efficiency. Indeed, the results depicted in table 6 have shown that firms’ 
corporate psychological characteristics explain a 46.6 % proportion of the board’s implication 
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in the decision making strategies (R
2 
=46, 6%). These results are actually corroborative of our 
set hypotheses: the high level of emotional intelligence enables to minimize the behavioural 
biases (i.e. the loss aversion bias), and achieve an effective control thereof. 
 
Regarding the results appearing on table 7, they have shown that firms’ corporate 
psychological characteristics explain a 60.8 % ratio of the board’s independence (R
2 
= 
60.8%). These results are supportive of the set hypotheses. In fact, emotional intelligence 
allows every individual to develop emotional consciousness, which in turn helps him react 
appropriately to different situations. It would actually help the manager to realize himself 
better and preserve his motivation to accomplish his shrews and task, among which control of 
the directing team. 
As for the results predicted in table 8, they have demonstrated that corporate psychological 
characteristics proportionately explain a 30.4 % fate of the CEO’s duality (R
2 
= 30.4%). These 
results do actually consolidate our assumed hypotheses. Indeed, emotions or emotional 
intelligence particularly guide the individual towards rationality. Data have suggested that the 
individuals enjoying a high level of emotional intelligence would be more aware of the 
factors affecting and influencing their positive and negative emotions. The awareness and 
understanding of these emotion-triggering factors would allow managers to choose the 
appropriate measures, take the convenient step and improve the board of directors’ efficiency 
as a governance means and mechanism. 
 
Finally, the empirical analysis of the relationship governing and binding emotional 
intelligence and the board of directors (board size, it members’ independence or presence of 
external directors’ and multifunctionality) has highlighted a positive impact of the 
Bangladeshi managers’ emotional intelligence on the effectiveness of control through this 
mechanism. It also affirms the complementary relationship between emotional intelligence 
and the directors’ board. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the present work is restrained by 
certain limitations, namely: 
 
 Firstly, some psychological aspects of theoretical nature could not be wholly approached in a 
complete empirical way. This limit is due, on the one hand, to the nature of the data sought, 
which may be perceived as being personal, or even secret as for as  the contracted leaders are 
concerned. On the other hand, it is due to the applied research tool which has not enables to 
achieve all the intended desired data. As a matter of fact the questionnaire turns out to be non-
flexible means of data collection. In our case, we have realized that certain questions or items 
(especially those measuring over-confidence managers’) should have been modified or added 
so that more accurate data could be reached and the theoretically-studied variables to be more 
operational. 
 
 The researcher’s representations regarding the studied variables (defined in terms of 
responses to the questionnaire), constitute a limit in so far as they are dealt with the 
throughout the various choices made all over the research; actually they do leave some trails 
of subjectivity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the impact of emotional intelligence on the directors’ board 
efficiency. Noteworthy, the aimed targeted behind this work has been devise an attempt has 
long prevailed over behavioural whereby to elaborately a predominant research gap that 
governance by implementing a survey conducted around some executives of large private 
companies in Bangladesh. Actually, the collected data analysis has shown the importance of 
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emotional intelligence as a prerequisite key skill or competence, (which may improve the 
controllers’ perception and evaluation of alternatives), in improving the control 
quality. Indeed, the empirical analysis of the emotional intelligence relationship with the 
board of directors (namely, regarding such factors as board size, presence of external 
executives and multifunction holding) has led to depict a positive impact of the Bangladeshi 
managers’ on the effectiveness of control via this mechanism. In addition, it has highlighted 
the complementary relationship between emotional intelligence and the board of directors. 
Nevertheless, the negative relationship between emotional intelligence and the behavioural 
biases reunions still not thoroughly evaluated none verified and has to be fact her checked. 
Given its numerous diverse personal, social and professional advantages, effects and benefits 
emotional intelligence turns out to be a worth developing skill that needs to be even deeply 
explored and further thoroughly promoted. 
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